DNA Test and Consent: 5 Crucial Takeaways from Delhi HC’s Landmark Ruling

DNA test and consent are not the same, rules the Delhi High Court in a rape acquittal appeal. Read the 5 key findings from Justice Madhu Jain’s landmark judgment.

DNA test and consent are two very different things, the Delhi High Court has clarified in a significant ruling that every criminal law practitioner and student should read closely. In KXXXXX v. The State Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr. (CRL.A. 320/2026), Justice Madhu Jain dismissed an appeal against the acquittal of a man accused of raping a woman over several years, holding that a DNA report proving paternity does not, by itself, prove that the underlying sexual relationship was non-consensual.

This article breaks down the facts, the reasoning, and the practical lessons from this judgment — including why the presumption under Section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act did not save the prosecution’s case.

Also Read- https://lawleaf.in/patna-high-court-2026-adultery-divorce/

Table of Contents

1. Background of the Case
2. Why the Trial Court Acquitted the Accused
3. DNA Test and Consent: The Core Legal Question
4. Section 114A and the Limits of the Presumption
5. The Delhi High Court’s Reasoning
6. Key Takeaways on DNA Test and Consent
7. Conclusion

Background of the Case

The prosecutrix was married to a man who had a 75% disability following a fall in 2007 and could not father a biological child; the couple had adopted a child in 2014. She alleged that Respondent No. 2, a family acquaintance, established a physical relationship with her from 2017 onwards through threats and inducements, including on one occasion by administering an intoxicating substance. She became pregnant and gave birth in June 2019. A DNA test conducted during the investigation confirmed that the accused was the biological father of the child.

An FIR was registered only in March 2021 — nearly four years after the first alleged incident — under Sections 376(2)(n), 377, 328, 506 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code. The accused, in his statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., admitted to having a physical relationship with the prosecutrix but claimed it was consensual and known to her husband.

Why the Trial Court Acquitted the Accused

The Additional Sessions Judge, Dwarka Courts, acquitted the accused of all charges on 07.10.2024. The trial court found:

• A highly belated FIR, filed nearly four years after the alleged first incident
• Material inconsistencies between the prosecutrix’s Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement, her complaint, and her courtroom testimony
• No corroboration medical, electronic, or otherwise for allegations of oral sex, nude photographs, or threatening videos
• No forensic recovery of the alleged intoxicant used to administer sedation

The trial court concluded that the accused had successfully rebutted the presumption under Section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act and acquitted him under all five sections.

DNA Test and Consent: The Core Legal Question

On appeal, the prosecutrix’s counsel argued that the DNA report — which conclusively established the accused as the biological father — was “the most clinching form of scientific evidence” and that the trial court had gravely erred in disregarding it. The central question before the Delhi High Court was therefore whether DNA evidence, once it proves sexual intercourse, also proves the absence of consent.

Justice Jain answered this squarely: it does not. As the Court observed, the DNA report is undoubtedly significant because it establishes the fact of intercourse, but it says nothing about the circumstances of that intercourse or whether it was consensual. This distinction — between proving intercourse and proving the nature of that intercourse — sits at the heart of the entire judgment.

Section 114A and the Limits of the Presumption

Under Section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, once sexual intercourse by the accused is proved in a rape prosecution under specified clauses of Section 376(2) IPC, and the woman states in her evidence that she did not consent, the court is required to presume absence of consent. This is a significant evidentiary tool designed to ease the burden on victims of sexual assault.

However, the Delhi High Court clarified that this statutory presumption does not make the prosecutrix’s testimony immune from scrutiny. The court must still examine whether the foundational facts are reliable, and whether the accused has produced evidence and circumstances sufficient to rebut the presumption. In this case, the trial court had found enough inconsistencies in the prosecutrix’s account — regarding the administration of the intoxicant, her state of consciousness during the alleged first assault, and the circumstances of her husband’s alleged suspicion about paternity — to hold that the presumption had been rebutted.

The Delhi High Court’s Reasoning

Justice Jain relied on the settled principle governing appeals against acquittal, reiterated recently by the Supreme Court in Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 89: an appellate court cannot overturn an acquittal merely because another view of the evidence is also possible. Interference is warranted only where the trial court’s view is perverse, based on a misreading of evidence, or where guilt is the only conclusion reasonably possible.

Applying this standard, the High Court held that the trial court had not ignored the DNA evidence — it had simply, and correctly, confined its evidentiary value to what it actually proved: paternity and the occurrence of intercourse, not the presence or absence of consent. The Court also cited State (GNCT of Delhi) v. Vipin @ Lalla, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 78, for the proposition that while a prosecutrix’s sole testimony can sustain a conviction, that testimony must still “inspire confidence” — a standard the trial court found was not met here given the cumulative inconsistencies across her statements.

Key Takeaways on DNA Test and Consent

For lawyers, students, and litigants following sexual assault jurisprudence, this ruling offers several practical lessons:

1. DNA evidence has a specific evidentiary scope. It conclusively proves biological paternity and the fact of intercourse — nothing more. Courts will not stretch it to answer the separate question of consent.
2. Statutory presumptions are not automatic convictions. Section 114A shifts the burden, but the accused can still rebut it through inconsistencies and circumstantial evidence, and courts remain bound to scrutinise the underlying testimony.
3. Delay in reporting matters, even if not decisive on its own. A four-year gap between the first alleged incident and the FIR was one of several factors — not the sole factor — that undermined the prosecution’s case.
4. Appellate courts apply a high threshold to reverse acquittals. A “possible view” taken by the trial court, even if not the only view, will typically survive appellate challenge.
5. Cumulative inconsistency, not isolated discrepancy, is the real test. The Court was careful to note that no single contradiction was fatal; it was the pattern of unexplained variations across the complaint, the Section 164 statement, and the courtroom testimony that mattered.

Conclusion

The Delhi High Court’s ruling in KXXXXX v. State is a useful reminder that forensic science and legal proof of consent operate on different planes. A DNA test can conclusively establish that intercourse occurred; it cannot tell a court whether that intercourse was consensual. That determination still rests on the quality, consistency, and credibility of testimonial evidence — assessed cumulatively, and with the statutory presumption under Section 114A applied, but not treated as irrebuttable.